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Memory of the Holocaust and the Shaping 
of Jewish Identity in Israel
This paper examines general trends and turning points in the construc­
tion of Jewish memory and identity in Israel as influenced by and based 
on the events of the Holocaust. The chapter will show the importance, as 
a factor in identity formation, of the slow and gradual evolution from the 
often rejected traumatic post-Holocaust memory, through the process of 
the social internalization and integration of this memory, to the current 
institutionalized memory. This process in Israel is connected with gener­
ation change from the first generation of eyewitnesses of the Holocaust, 
through the second generation of new Zionist citizens, to the third and 
fourth generations looking for their identity in the globalized world.
This paper is rooted in political science and will try to determine 
(a) how memory of past events is represented by and influences the con­
temporary political and social life of a democratic country; (b) what role 
remembrance plays in achieving social and political goals; and (c) who is 
responsible for the shape of memory in the society. These are particularly 
important questions at a time when historical relativism and revisionism 
are used as tools in international relations, and when gradual global­
ization provokes confrontation with memories. This topic is important 
for Poland as a country which, only beginning in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, entered onto a path of social dialogue and bilateral 
relations with Israel. Those relations are still strongly emotional because 
of the historical and stereotypical burden involved. Understanding each 
partner’s collective memory and identity and confronting it with our 
own mental images seems to be the only path of future dialogue. The 
study of memory and identity building in Israel can also help Poland to 
deal with its own past and images.
Memory and identity are integral to how modem democracies influ­
ence state politics and social life. Of course, we can easily claim and 
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prove the opposite, namely that state politics and social life are integral 
parts of memory and identity. These notions, regardless their broader or 
narrower meaning, are always inseparably connected, each of them the 
necessary condition and function of the other. Their internal relation is 
so strong that in many cases it is hard to decide which of them is primary 
and which is secondary. Only in relation to individual political and social 
facts can we say that memory “comes” later, so is therefore secondary. 
On more general grounds, however, we notice that political decision 
making and social life are influenced by memory of past decisions and 
events. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this article, we need to stress the 
basic difference between memory and identity versus state politics and 
social life. Memory and identity are intangible and imagined notions, 
created and shared by some larger group of population, while state poli­
tics and social life are very tangible because they are built on social and 
political facts. The intangibility of memory and identity does not make 
those two abstract. On the contrary - they always tend to be inseparable 
from time, place, factual events and people, who provide specific mean­
ings. By this means we can see in state history two parallel realities, one 
factual and the other imagined, developed in parallel and influencing 
one another (Halbwachs 1992, Le Goff 1992, Anderson 1983).
One must also distinguish between memory and identity, but at the 
same time understand how they interact. Memory takes different forms, 
depending on who is influencing and who is sharing it. It can be personal, 
private, or family, but can also belong to larger cultural groups, tribes, 
or whole societies. There is always some anthropological, political, 
or social context in which memory is created and shared. Private or 
group preferences allow, and sometimes enforce, changes, omissions and 
interpretations which serve some current purpose or need, but alterations 
are sometimes implemented without visible aim (Thelen 1989).
Maurice Halbwachs uses the term “collective memory,” a very use­
ful construct for the purposes of this article. For Halbwachs, collective 
memory has nothing in common with historical facts shared by some 
community; rather, it stands in opposition to history. In order to have a 
proper historical understanding, one needs to recognize the whole com­
plexity, take different perspectives and accept ambiguities. This does not 
happen with collective memory, which tends to simplify events, takes 
one biased perspective and does not tolerate ambiguities. Collective 
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memory does not recognize chronology and time; it interpolates events, 
and is created to justify the foundations of group or social status. Ac­
cording to Halbwachs (1992), collective memory is the reconstruction 
of the past with the data and facts from the present time; it is based 
on stories and documents provided by eyewitnesses, as processed later 
by historians. Halbwachs makes a distinction between social memory 
and historical memory. Social memory is the memory of personally 
witnessed events, it is a form of group experience which is remem­
bered. In terms of the Holocaust, social memory is reserved for the 
generation of survivors only. On the other hand, historical memory is 
the processed and shared historical creation presented in secondary de­
scriptions, books, films and the educational system. Historical memory 
refers to and is shared by the majority of Jews in Israel because they 
were bom after the Holocaust.
In this process of combining past and present and looking for some 
continuity of events, historiography casts elements of national identity. 
But social and historical memory represent only part of the phenomenon 
of national identity. National identity is an amalgam of collective mem­
ories, symbols, myths and prejudices connected with the past, present 
and future of a nation. It contains the nation’s characteristics, including 
its genealogy, past, tradition, victories and defeats, heroes, and even 
current and future plans. Identity, a deeply emotional notion, can easily 
generate patriotic or even nationalistic feelings. Identity and its elements 
are rarely criticized and revised because this could shake the foundations 
of the social and political system (Anderson 1983, Sztompka 2002).
STATE FOUNDATIONS
Before I focus on Holocaust memory, I would like to briefly discuss 
other elements of Israeli identity. In relatively new societies based on 
immigrants, it is hard to extract, especially in the beginning, one dom­
inating cultural pattern which may become a common denominator for 
all members of society. In the case of Israel, however, it is worthwhile 
to identify the factors that were common to many of the immigrants, 
starting from the time before the founding of the Israeli state: a com­
mon religion, common genealogy, memory of the biblical Israel, a new 
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Hebrew language, Zionism, memory of European anti-Semitism, and 
memory of the Holocaust (Segev 1989). In the course of Israeli history 
we can observe a gradual replacement of the ancient, genealogical, Zion­
ist and religious factors by the images and memories of more current 
events. This process was an outgrowth of modem Israeli experience. 
Heroism, a militaristic society, and the Middle East conflict are the new 
identity factors that have emerged. The only exceptions to this process 
are memories of the Holocaust and European anti-Semitism, which are 
both part of the foundation of the state. Their role in collective memory 
and identity remains vivid, growing continuously by gaining new forms 
and representations. This is explainable in case of anti-Semitism, which 
cannot be treated as a strictly historical phenomenon because it is still 
present in modem societies. We cannot talk about the Holocaust as a 
current phenomenon, but only as a revived memory. The importance of 
this memory, as evidenced by Israel’s attempt to stress its unique Jewish 
character, is shown in the change in terminology from “Holocaust” to 
“Shoa.” In recent years many research institutions and museum respon­
sible for the presentation of history and memory, such as Yad Vashem 
and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, have broadened 
the definition of the Holocaust. Thus, the Holocaust is no longer per­
ceived as a uniquely Jewish experience. More and more projects are 
presenting the reality of the Holocaust in modem times. These projects 
focus on exposing common patterns of peipetrators and victims, not 
only of the Nazi Holocaust, but also of other societies, such as Bosnia, 
Rwanda and Darfur, where genocide and other crimes against humanity 
have also occurred.
The majority of prime factors crucial to Israeli identity can be found 
in the “Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel,” later re­
peated in the basic legal code. In the Declaration of May 14, 1948, 
we read:
The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of 
millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency 
of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel 
the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to 
every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged 
member of the comity of nations.
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Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts 
of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, 
restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of 
dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.
In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed 
its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against 
the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war 
effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the 
United Nations.
The document clearly indicates that the establishment of a state 
was a consequence of the Holocaust and that the state grew out of the 
necessity to protect world Jewry and to counteract any future genocide. 
The Holocaust, by provoking strong moral trauma for all of humanity, 
stimulated world leaders to establish the State of Israel (Segev 2002).
Theories concerning collective memory and identity can be easily 
applied to the case of Israel’s memory of the Holocaust. Holocaust 
memory in the almost 60 years of the country’s history never remained 
constant, especially because it was transformed from collective memory 
of the first generation to the historical, or cultural, memory of the sabras 
bom in Israel.
FIRST GENERATION
In the second half of 1945 around 90000 Jewish refugees arrived in 
Palestine from Europe. All of them had survived under Nazi or Soviet 
occupation, and the majority had been in concentration camps. Over 
the next three years, another 60 000 survivors would follow, and in the 
first years of statehood an additional 200 000 European survivors would 
emigrate to Israel. At the end of 1949 there were around 350 000 Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust living in Israel, representing one third of the 
population (Sikron 1957).
Those survivors were not warmly welcomed in their new state and 
nation. In the 1940’s and 1950’s in Israel, on the wave of constructing 
a new identity, there was no space in public discourse for non-heroic 
elements. Those who, according to general opinion, had been led like 
“sheep to slaughter” did not get recognition in the eyes of battle hard­
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ened Israelis. Moreover, their histories and memories were treated as 
a social, collective taboo. During this period Israelis were unwilling to 
confront the traumatic memory of the Holocaust; they were reluctant 
to ask questions and unable to listen. This attitude toward memory is 
very typical when, in the period just after a traumatic event, society 
attempts to recover through forgetting, often through destruction of ma­
terial evidence like monuments and prisons, but also by rejecting the 
witness or survivors. This was especially true in the newly-created State 
of Israel, which was going through its own internal and external prob­
lems and wars and trying to forge a new strong identity, built out of 
immigrants. Some role in this rejection process was also played by the 
sense of responsibility and overwhelming feeling of helplessness when 
the Holocaust was happening in Europe and information about it was 
reaching Palestine (Dobkin 1946).
The survivors, on the other hand, had to face the psychological 
problem of starting a new life, often with a feeling of guilt for being 
a survivor in the first place. If any interest was shown in their stories 
it was always aimed at making the survivors justify their survival. An 
additional burden was the lack of language to describe the cruelties of 
war and genocide, a lack not only of a means of expression, but also a 
lack of commonly shared language in Israel at that time. This situation 
left the survivors trapped in their own memories, which could only 
be shared, at best, with the closest members of their families. Parents 
sometimes forced their children to acknowledge the burden of memory 
by giving them the names of family members murdered in Europe (Elon 
1983). New immigrants often broke ties with those family members who 
decided to stay in Europe after the Holocaust.
The emerging Israeli collective memory and identity were based on 
faith in the possibilities of a new man, created and shaped by Zionist 
ideology. The memory of Holocaust survivors was in some way dehu­
manized by referring to this generation as to “sheep led to slaughter” or 
“human dust.” In that period it was necessary for society to forget about 
the old world order and roots remaining in Europe. Everybody was to be 
focused on the construction of a new heroic and strong society, which 
will never again allow itself to be oppressed.
Some survivors were able to find relief through fierce belief in and 
construction of the new Israeli Zionist identity, at the same time sus- 
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pending their traumatic experiences indefinitely. They were trying to 
deal with the nightmares on their own, depriving their children of an­
swers to questions which were often formulated among the younger 
generation, but rarely asked. It was also common for survivors to falsify 
their past in order to be perceived as heroic fighters who had been bom 
in Israel (Palestine) (Dasberg 2000).
The majority of survivors were sent to kibbutzim, where they had to 
take Hebrew names and learn to operate within the frames of a totally 
new Zionist identity. Those first years only intensified Holocaust trauma 
for many survivors, deprived of professional help and left alone to deal 
with this chapter of their lives. In the official political discourse, the 
survivors were referred to as people who needed to be “re-educated”; 
they had to learn to love their new country and incorporate the moral 
values of Israeli society. Memory of the Holocaust was socially frozen 
(Segev 2000).
At the same time, political and social life in Israel began to face 
the problem of the Holocaust and its definition. There were three ma­
jor events in the 1950’s and the beginning of the 1960’s which dealt 
directly or indirectly with social and political dimensions of the Holo­
caust and affected the shaping by Israelis of memory and identity. These 
were passage of the “Law of Return,” The creation of Yad Vashem 
and the establishment of relations with Germany and negotiation of 
war reparations.
The creation of the Law of Return was the first, basic legal act in the 
new country. From the very beginning, the founders of Israel wanted 
to make the new country safe and always accessible to all Jews in the 
world in need of shelter. This was a lesson learned from memory of 
past persecutions and particularly from the Holocaust. Most Israelis 
remembered the British immigration quota, which had blocked access 
of European Jews to Palestine.
The second milestone in the Israeli approach to the Holocaust in the 
1950’s was the legal establishment of Yad Vashem. Initial attempts to 
commemorate the Holocaust had been made in 1942, while a majority 
of the victims were still alive. The name Yad Vashem was suggested 
at that time for a place that would commemorate the war victims and 
heroes of Israel. Even during the war, politicians in Palestine referred 
to the Holocaust as some distant event from the past, quite often link­
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ing commemoration with the need for reparations (Dobkin 1946). Mass 
emigration from Europe and the Independence War in Israel put the 
commemoration plans on hold. The Yad Vashem plan was revitalized by 
Mordechai Shenhabi in 1950, who officially requested the institutions 
of the new country to continue the registration of Holocaust victims 
and to grant posthumous Israeli citizenship to all victims. However, the 
lawyers who were to give opinions on honorary citizenship for victims 
could not reach agreement, so the government established the Holocaust 
Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority, postponing considera­
tion of the citizenship problem. In 1951 the Knesset designated 27 Nisan 
as Yom Ha-Shoa, a day of Holocaust Remembrance in Israel. On the 
May 18, 1953, the Knesset unanimously approved the Yad Vashem Es­
tablishment Bill, which established the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ 
Remembrance Authority. The juxtaposition of destruction with the hero­
ism of the resistance fighters had been present in Israel from the very 
beginning, and it became an integral part of memory and identity build­
ing. At that time it was the only possible way to reconcile the painful 
history of the Holocaust with heroic Zionism. In its first years of exis­
tence, Yad Vashem limited itself to collecting data about victims. The 
first exhibition opened in 1958 in the administration building. Due to the 
social climate during this period, Yad Vashem had very limited impact on 
collective memory and identity. However, this would change very soon.
The third event in the 1950’s that was crucial to revitalization of 
Holocaust memory was the establishment of bilateral economic rela­
tions with Germany, including intensive debate about reparations for 
Israel. David Ben-Gurion, ever the pragmatic politician, would have 
made a variety of concessions if they could have led to development of 
the Israeli state. The Israeli boycott of Germany had to be eased when 
trade possibilities favorable for Israel emerged and the prospects for 
reparations and compensation grew. In the emotional political battles of 
that time we can see the conflict between religion, culture and memory 
of the Holocaust on one side and, on the other, new elements of Israeli 
identity focusing on national development and the needs of future gen­
erations. At this point of its development, Israel was becoming much 
more directed toward the future. This is why negotiations with Germany 
were successful, leading to the establishment of bilateral relations and 
payment of reparations. On this occasion different political parties in
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Israel noticed the potential of memory of the Holocaust. Menahem Be­
gin and his Herut party pictured themselves as defenders of the national 
dignity and Holocaust memory by strongly opposing Ben-Gurion’s ne­
gotiations. However, most Israelis were not ready to defend memory 
yet, because it was still shared only by the survivors, and therefore had 
limited impact on Israeli society as a whole.
THE EICHMANN TRIAL
The beginning of the 1960’s saw the Eichmann trial, and with it a 
fundamental change in the approach to memory of the Holocaust could 
be observed. In the late 1950’s, the Mossad received information on 
where Eichmann was hiding. In May 1959 he was kidnapped in Buenos 
Aires and transported to Israel. His trial in lerusalem did not start until 
April 1961. The interim between his capture and trial witnessed an 
intense debate among Israelis about how to deal with memory of the 
Holocaust, a debate that would prove decisive for the future shape of 
historical memory. It was the first time that Israeli society had a chance to 
acknowledge the survivors’ history, to live through them and internalize 
their experience, thereby creating a common historical memory of the 
Holocaust. The trial was broadcast on national TV and widely covered 
in the newspapers.
Eichmann was tried on the basis of the Israeli “Nazis and Nazi Col­
laborators Punishment Law,” which was introduced by the Knesset in 
1950. This Law precisely categorized Nazi crimes and provided punish­
ments under Israeli law. From the memory perspective it is interesting 
that crimes committed on European territory against Jews, who had 
been citizens of many different countries, were in this case understood 
as crimes committed on Israeli territory and judged in the light of Israeli 
law. (A similar situation had occurred a few years earlier, when Israel 
claimed to be the sole representative of Holocaust victims in negotiating 
German reparations.) The idea of judging perpetrators in light of Israeli 
Law was socially understood as a posthumous moral victory.
From a logistical point of view, it would have been much easier to 
kill Eichmann in Argentina, but in this case it was not Eichmann that was 
important, it was the trial itself, taking place in Jerusalem, conducted 
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by the society that was gradually becoming a society of survivors. The 
trial was used as a kind of group therapy for the whole nation. Dat­
ing from this event we can observe a gradual transition of Holocaust 
memory from painful and hard to encompassing trauma into institution­
alized, nationally shared historical memory. Until that moment, images 
of the Holocaust were haunting many of the survivors, imprisoning 
them in years of silence. The Eichmann trail forced them to confront 
their traumatic memories and pass them on, often for the first time, to 
their children and then to succeeding generations.
Political interest was also apparent. Throughout the Eichmann trial, 
Ben-Gurion sought to project a positive image for his Mapai party, 
sidestepping allegations of passivity during the Holocaust and directing 
attention away from the recent Kastner trial, thereby guaranteeing future 
control of the Holocaust legacy and its memory for his Mapai party. The 
leading Mapai party also had a few social aims to be achieved through the 
Eichmann trial. The first was to integrate the Holocaust experience into 
the next generations of Israelis, who were brought up in the atmosphere 
of silence about Shoa. Of course, this education had to be carefully 
prepared; facts had to be chosen and presented for the needs of Israeli 
society in a way that would not threaten or destroy the image of heroism 
promoted from the beginning of the state’s creation. Memory of the 
Holocaust had to be reconciled with Zionist ideology, still strong in 
society, in order to achieve the desired effect of national unification 
around the commonly shared memory of the Holocaust.
In the early 1960’s, the ethos of Jewish pioneers developing the land 
of their forefathers was fading away. First, tensions between Moroccan 
Jews and the Ashkenazi establishment were endangering the status quo. 
Ben-Gurion decided to include these “oriental” Jews in the process of 
Holocaust education, so that every member of society could treat this 
event as a reference point and means of social integration. There was a 
need to find an idea that could unite the society again, an idea that would 
be purifying and patriotic and that would lead to national catharsis.
But the Eichmann trail also had its international ramifications and 
aims in the minds of the Mapai leaders. Their first objective was to make 
world leaders interested in Holocaust history again, at the same time 
stressing that it was an Israeli historical experience. The second objec­
tive was to show the connection between past endangerment of the Jews 
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in Europe and the present endangerment of Israel by the neighboring, 
hostile Arab states surrounding it. This process equated anti-Semitism 
with anti-Zionism. The Eichmann trial established a new memory pat­
tern for future generations of Israelis, in which Holocaust memory was 
gradually integrated with Zionist heroism.
THE SECOND GENERATION
After the Eichmann trial, Israeli society was never again the same in its 
approach to Holocaust memory. The succeeding years, which saw an es­
calation of the Middle East conflict and increasing militarization, would 
also be affected by memory of the Holocaust. The former juxtaposition 
of Holocaust with heroism had to be replaced by reconciliation of these 
two Jewish and Israeli experiences. Unfortunately, this often led to use 
of Holocaust memory for political aims.
Holocaust survivors fought in all the Israeli wars. The first immi­
grants had to fight in the Independence War, yet this did not integrate 
them into the new society. Even after the war was won, the division 
of the Israeli army into heroic sabras and passive European Jews was 
preserved (Yablonka 2000). The second war was fought in 1956. At that 
moment, the first attempts were made to link the current fear of destruc­
tion of Israel with the fear known from the period of the Holocaust. It 
was still too early, however, because social awareness of the Holocaust 
was relatively low. On the other hand, in this war Israeli society had to 
face the problem of becoming an occupier and even taking responsibility 
for massacres in Kfar Kassem and Dajr Jasin. During this period, the 
cooperation of the survivors with the sabras was based on four basic 
foundations: The Holocaust was a major factor in the establishment of 
Israel; the world was hostile and did nothing to save the Jews; there is 
a linkage between the Holocaust and heroism; and the less talk about 
Holocaust the better (Smith 2001).
The war of 1967 was fought in the context of new Holocaust memory 
realities, memory which had been gradually internalized and become a 
part of identity. Just before the war, when Nasser was spreading propa­
ganda about American ships evacuating Jews from Israel and promising 
total destruction of the country, the mental connection to the Holocaust 
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was inescapable. The Religious Council of Tel Aviv surveyed the city’s 
parks, sport fields and empty plots and sanctified them as cemeteries 
(Segev 2000). One of the young soldiers in a later interview for The 
Seventh Day said:
People believed we would be exterminated if we lost the war. We got this 
idea - or inherited it - from the concentration camps. It’s a concrete idea for 
anyone who has grown up in Israel, even if he personally didn’t experience 
Hitler’s persecution. Genocide - it is a real possibility. There are the means 
to do it. That’s the lesson of the gas chambers. The fact of Jewish existence 
in Israel isn’t yet unquestionable. (Deutsch 1971, p. 160)
The politics of Nasser were continually compared to those of Hitler, 
but at the same time heroic acts in Jewish and Israeli history were also 
recalled. The fear of destruction led the Israeli Defense Forces to attack 
all three neighboring countries on June 5,1967. The war was soon over, 
with a spectacular victory and seizure of new territories: Sinai, Gaza, 
the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Society was 
gradually becoming aware of the enormous victory and the meaning of 
Israel returning to the Old City in Jerusalem and to the Western Wall. 
The spirit of battle and the final victory were attributed to the Holocaust 
memory as well. Uri Ramon, a young officer, said in this regard:
Two days before, when we felt that we were at the decisive moment and I was 
in uniform, armed and grimy for a night patrol, I came to the Ghetto Fighters 
Museum at Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot. I wanted to pay my respects to the 
memory of the fighters, only some of whom had reached this day when the 
nation was rising up to defend itself. I felt clearly that our war began there, in 
the crematoriums, in the camps, in the ghettos and in the forests. I have left 
this museum pure and clear and strong for this war. (Ramon 1969, p. 57)
The social feeling was that the time had finally come when others 
were suffering loss, and the problem of constant fear and endangerment 
had been solved once and forever. The Israelis proved to themselves and 
others that they were no longer “sheep led to slaughter.” Now, they had 
a country and nation able to face any enemy. This was also the moment 
when Israeli militarism was mythologized, because the society felt itself 
closer to the heroic defenders of the Warsaw Ghetto than to the victims 
of the death camps. With this victory a new question arose: whether the 
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Israeli army, cherishing the legacy of the Holocaust, could now serve as 
an occupation force in the new territories.
The euphoria did not last long, because the Yom Kippur War of 1973 
once again brought the phantom of the Holocaust before everyone’s 
eyes. This time the element of surprise was used by the Arab armies. 
In the Sinai Campaign in 1956, the fear of destruction came just before 
victory and led to the Israeli Army withdrawal. During the Six-Day War, 
fear was present before the war and provided the stimulus that led to 
victory. In 1973 fear came in the middle of the campaign, and it shook the 
very foundations of the country. The war was finally won, but at the cost 
of 2 500 victims, representing one victim per thousand Israeli citizens. 
The war was a serious blow to the sense of security gained in 1967. Once 
again, everyone realized that destruction was possible. The Israeli ideas 
of self-sufficiency and heroism promoted in the education system faded 
away in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. Israel needed financial support 
not only from the Diaspora, but also from the international community.
After 1973, Menachem Begin was elected prime minister. From the 
very beginning of his political career, he was promoted as a fighter for 
Holocaust memory and its representation in society. Indeed, he often 
presented himself as a survivor of the Holocaust. During his tenure, he 
was successful in integrating the Holocaust into the cultural memory 
of his own constituency, who were mainly Sephardic Jews. This was 
important, because for this group the Holocaust was not a personal ex­
perience, so they often accused the Ashkenazi establishment of misusing 
the Holocaust and its memory for political purposes.
The next military conflict, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, once 
again inspired political and social comparisons to the Holocaust. Before 
the invasion, Begin addressed the members of his cabinet:
You know what I have done and what we have all done to prevent war and 
loss of life. But such is our fate in Israel. There is no way other then to fight 
selflessly. Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided that 
there will be no more Treblinkas. (Noar 1986, p. 47)
When Israel was criticized in international circles, especially for 
massacres which were carried out with the knowledge of Israeli Defense 
Forces in two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, Begin kept 
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repeating that after the Holocaust nobody in the world had the right to 
teach moral lessons to Israel.
Such misuse of Holocaust memory by the government evoked almost 
immediate social discussion, led mainly by the left-wing supporters. In 
the beginning of the 1980’s, the journalist Boaz Evron wrote an article, 
“The Holocaust: A Danger to the Nation,” in which he predicted a 
turning point in the way that Holocaust memory would be shaped. First, 
he attacked the view of the Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish experience 
by presenting the Nazi plan to exterminate the Gypsies, the mentally 
and physically handicapped, and other groups. He accused the Zionist 
leaders and their ideology of using memory of a Jewish-only Holocaust 
in order to promote the moral superiority of Israel while at the same 
time creating an isolated society (Segev 2000). He also condemned 
the constant comparison of Arab countries with the Third Reich. Such 
an approach by its leaders was portrayed as a real threat to Israel and 
its people. From this moment onward we can observe researchers and 
politicians presenting more general and global conclusions drawn from 
the Holocaust experience. Memory of the Holocaust gradually became 
not just an Israeli domain, but a more global phenomenon (2001).
War and conflict in different forms, from World War II to the oc­
cupation of Lebanon and the Intifada, would become integral elements 
of Israeli identity. Each generation of Israelis identified itself with the 
particular war or wars that had the greatest impact on them, as a result 
of personal participation in war, loss of family members, or memory 
of splendid victory. The gradual internalization of Holocaust memory 
led to the point that World War II and the Holocaust became common 
experiences, shared by all of Israeli society.
MEMORY TODAY: REFLECTIONS
Andreas Huyssen writes that “remembrance as a vital human activity 
shapes our links to the past, and the ways we remember define us in the 
present. As individuals and societies, we need the past to construct and 
to anchor our identities and to nurture a vision of the future” (71). This 
view is prominent in the current Israeli approach to Holocaust memory. 
The key role in the process of shaping and preserving this memory is 
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played by specialized museum institutions and monuments, created to 
conduct research, to educate and to promote memory. This role grows 
when members of society commemorate events of the past, creating 
objective, collective memory, to be shared by everyone.
Those institutions play a crucial role in inter-generational memory 
transmission. To understand this process it is crucial to make a distinc­
tion between primary and secondary witnesses of the Holocaust. Primary 
narratives are based on experienced events and are remembered as so­
cial memory. Secondary narratives are versions of the primary ones, 
reproduced in the processes of conducting research, searching for gen­
eralizations, drawing conclusions and offering commentaries. All this 
is a part of the historical memory of society. Hirsch defines historical 
memory and its images as “postmemory”:
Postmemory is distinguished from memory by generational distance and 
from history by deep personal connection. Postmemory is a powerful and 
very particular form of memory precisely because its connection to its ob­
ject or source is mediated not through recollection but through imaginative 
investment and creation. (22)
The task of forging and preserving postmemory of the Holocaust in 
Israel was given mainly to Yad Vashem, but also to other commemora­
tion institutions like kibbutzim, Yad Mordecai, Lohamei Hagetaot, and 
numerous museums and monuments all over the country. These institu­
tions, with their various political affiliations, have always aimed to forge 
social identity in the country. Very direct political influence is visible 
during numerous commemoration days.
In order to observe how Israeli identity continues to be shaped today, 
we should have a closer look at the different commemoration days and 
state festivals introduced and shaped by politicians in Israel. In 1951 
the Knesset passed a bill creating a day of commemoration of “The 
Holocaust and the Ghetto Uprising” (Yom Ha-Shoa Ve'Hagvura). Only 
in 1959 was a second bill passed, mandating how this day should be 
observed. The name was changed to “The Commemoration Day of the 
Holocaust and Heroism.” This included a day of national mourning, 
with official political ceremonies at Yad Vashem and sirens at noon. 
The next bill, passed in 1961 in response to the demands of the leftist 
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lobby for Uprising commemoration and the religious lobby for a more 
religious character to the day, remains in force. The day is now named 
“The Commemoration Day of Holocaust Uprising and Heroism,” and 
starts, according to the religious calendar, on the evening preceding the 
27th day of Nissan.
By following the name changes we can observe the political im­
portance of this day. In the final version from 1961, the single word 
“Holocaust” was replaced by two words: “Uprising” and “Heroism.” 
A week after this day is another day of commemoration day: Yom Ha- 
Zikaron, in memory of the Jewish soldiers who fell during all of Israel’s 
wars. The sirens sound once again, and the week between Yom Ha-Shoa 
and Yom Ha-Zikaron is designated a period of mourning and remem­
brance of Holocaust and heroism.
After this time of mourning is a catharsis in the form of two joyful 
state festivals. The first of these is Yom Ha-Acmaut (Independence Day), 
celebrated on 4 Iyar, just one day after Yom Ha-Zikaron. Independence 
Day is the anniversary of British withdrawal from Palestine and procla­
mation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. It is a festival in which 
elements of Zionist ideas are still visible. At the end of the month, 28 
Iyar, is the celebration of Yom Jerushalaim (Day of Jerusalem). This 
holiday commemorates the re-unification of Jerusalem under Israeli ad­
ministration after the Six-Day War of 1967.
There is no doubt that shaping social memory in Israel and forging 
a common Israeli identity have been an important internal policy tasks 
of successive governments. The current aims in the country’s social 
and internal policy can be achieved by skillful and conscious collective 
memory building and bringing to public attention only chosen historical 
events. This defines and helps to achieve the aims of social integrity, 
feelings of independence, and historical awareness and constant morale 
building, crucial for a country in a continuous state of emergency (Levy 
2000, Perlmutter 2000).
In recent decades there has been a noticeable weakening of Zionist 
ideology in Israel in the wake of gradual globalization and Ameri­
canization of Israeli society. At the same time the rise of individual 
and collective Holocaust consciousness and remembrance is becoming 
more central to Israeli identity.
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